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Reductio ad absurdum arguments remain popular with philosophers, and for good reason. If a 
viewpoint can be characterised by a set of premises, and it can be shown that this set of premises 
together imply some false, self-contradictory, or otherwise absurd conclusion, then these premises 
cannot all be true at the same time, and thus the viewpoint is untenable. Nevertheless, there is a 
problem with applying this form of argument to views with which one disagrees, in that it is difficult 
to characterise a view fairly and accurately if one thinks it false. The logic of reductio arguments 
typically depends on the aptness of some analogy or other. However, assessing the aptness of an 
analogy will depend on subtle underlying interpretative principles and these will not be available 
unless one has a minimally sympathetic understanding of the view one is criticising. The danger with 
not adopting something like Donald Davidson’s “principle of charity” is that the argument will miss 
its target and will succeed only in knocking down a straw man. This seems to be a likely outcome of 
arguments of the form: “If you think X (which I don't) then you must think Y (which is absurd)”. 
At one level, the volume edited by Antoine Suarez and Joachim Huarte could be seen as a response 
to a reductio ad absurdum argument which purports to demonstrate that one cannot reasonably 
attribute full moral status to the early human embryo. Peter Singer and others have argued that cell 
reprogramming (whether by cell nuclear replacement or by induction using vectors) implies that, if a 
pre-implantation human embryo is a human being, then every cell in the human body is a human 
being! An obvious counter to these arguments is to protest that the analogy is not apt, that somatic 
cells are simply not similar enough to embryonic stem cells, which in turn are not similar enough to 
embryos, for the logic to proceed. However, to demonstrate convincingly that these analogies are 
not apt it is necessary to provide a more complete narrative, which grounds an alternative set of 
analogies which are apt. This is precisely what Suarez and Huarte aim to do. 
Rather than simply rebutting the reductio, this volume takes up the challenge and seeks to explore, 
carefully and in detail, the implications of technologies such as cell reprogramming. All the authors in 
this collection accept the premise that, in the paradigm case, it is reasonable to trace the existence 
of a human being back to the generation of a human embryo through fertilisation of egg with sperm. 
Human life (typically) begins at fertilisation. Given this premise, these authors then ask, what should 
be said about cells which while embryo-like also seem unlike embryos in some respects? The volume 
is called Is this Cell a Human Being? It might have been called When is an embryo not an embryo? 
How can one decide whether novel cells (such as embryonic stem cells or induced pluripotent stem 
cells) and cell-entities (such as parthenotes, hydatidiform moles, the products of altered nuclear 
transfer, and interspecies mixtures) are, or are not, relevantly similar to human embryos such as to 
merit the same ontological and moral status?  
The papers are the fruit of a meeting held in Barcelona in 2009, hosted by the Social Trends Institute. 
Of the seven papers presented at that meeting, six are reproduced in this volume (the seventh, by 
Helen Watt has already been published in the proceedings of the Third International Colloquium of 
the International Association of Catholic Bioethicists). Suarez and Huarte have expanded the volume 
by adding a scientific chapter (by Greber and Schöler), papers by Patrick Lee and Pablo Requena 
Meana, and two further papers of their own (as introduction and conclusion to the volume). Meana 
was a discussant at the meeting in Barcelona and his paper is very helpful from a Catholic 
perspective in relating the discussion to the Vatican Instruction Dignitas Personae (which was issued 
after the Barcelona meeting).  
As someone who was present myself at that meeting, I am delighted to see the papers now shared 
with a wider audience. One of the striking features of that meeting, still apparent in this volume, is 
how scientists and philosophers who agree about when it is that human life begins in the ordinary 
case, nevertheless may disagree quite radically about how to identify human embryos from among 
the products of novel biotechnologies. I take this to be not a weakness but a strength of the 
collection, and something that demonstrates the credibility of this response to cell reprogramming 
from scholars who accord the human embryo full moral status. Rather than receiving a simple 
rhetorical answer, Singer’s reductio has generated a complex discourse.   
Suarez and Huarte have edited the volume and have allowed themselves three papers in which to 
put their own view, so it seems reasonable to use their account as the basis for this review. They 
have together developed a criterion which they think succeeds in distinguishing embryos from non-
embryos. In brief, an embryo is a living organism that has “the proper biological potential for 
developing the neural activity responsible for controlling spontaneous motility” (p. 4 and chapters 5 
and 11). In focusing on spontaneous motility they exclude “the autonomous activity of the heart” (p. 
60) or other organs, and they defend this exclusion by drawing an analogy between certain embryo-
like entities with a heartbeat and brain-dead human adults. They further make the claim that it is 
possible to test empirically whether an entity is an embryo by testing whether it has a defect that 
Directly Inhibits the Appearance of Neural Activity (DIANA). As an example they claim that the inner 
cell mass (ICM) of an embryo created by fertilisation is a human being even when stripped of its 
trophectoderm (TE), whereas the ICM of standard parthenotes, which can develop “at best, up to 
the stage of heart beating and yolk sac circulation, but are not capable of going beyond that stage” 
(p. 185), are not human beings.  
Suarez and Huarte have performed a service to readers by proposing model criteria to distinguish 
between embryos and non-embryos and by showing how these can be applied to different cases. 
However, the criteria they propose are problematic on a number of levels. 
In the first place, the criterion of “potential for… spontaneous motility” sits uneasily between the 
“radical capacity for conceptual choice and deliberate choice” (p. 84) defended by Patrick Lee and 
the “coordinated production of functionally integrated structures” (p. 29) defended by Maureen 
Condic (and also Nicanor Austriaco p. 48 and William Hurlbut, p. 166). Within the Catholic tradition 
the activity that has been regarded as most characteristically human is intellectual, hence human 
beings are called “rational animals”. On the other hand the first and most basic activity of a living 
organism, which shows the presence of psyche, in the Aristotelian sense, is vegetative. The 
demonstration of spontaneous motility is neither the end point of development (rational activity of a 
mature adult) nor is it the first act of an organism (integrative biological activity). It therefore seems 
arbitrary to choose potential for this level of functioning as the key criterion for human life. 
In the second place, it must be asked whether, even on their own criterion, the existence of a 
heartbeat should be regarded as vegetative. There are no plants with heartbeat and this kind of 
regular self-motion is characteristic of animals. I am persuaded that “cell division and even some 
evidence of progressive differentiation do not alone indicate the presence of an organism” (p. 166) 
and also that simple blastocyst-like structures may be generated by processes other than true 
embryogenesis. A dividing cluster of human cells is not necessarily an embryo. However, if an entity 
progresses so far as to reach the stage of heartbeat then it clearly shows some overarching 
integration of parts. The arguments against recognising such an entity as an embryo of some kind 
(albeit one that will perish early in development) succeed only in begging the question. 
Finally, it should be noted that Suarez and Huarte are somewhat eccentric in their usage of the 
terms totipotent and pluripotent. Rather than define totipotent as meaning capable of developing all 
cell types including the TE,(p. 202) Suarez and Huarte define totipotent to mean “sharing the proper 
biological potential to develop into a human fetus” (p. 186) even if this is the case only when 
combined with TE. This usage is not only idiosyncratic but implies that the TE can be characterised 
merely as an organ, like the heart, which might be replaced. Suarez and Huarte show no recognition 
that the ICM requires the TE to generate pattern and order, without which it remains a disorganised 
clump of cells. As Maureen Condic said at the meeting in Barcelona (according to my own, imperfect, 
memory of the event), “if I were forced to say where the seat of the soul was located in the 
blastocyst, I would say, ‘in the trophectoderm!’”    
The most valuable contribution of the editors of this volume is thus more as editors than as writers. 
Nevertheless, the book as a whole is a thoughtful and important resource for reflection in this area. 
There have been journal articles in various places but I know of no other substantial volume where 
people who share a common starting point on the status of the embryo have sought to resolve as far 
as possible the obscure status of novel cellular artefacts created by human biotechnology.  
In some cases the resolution is very clear:  several authors provide good arguments against 
regarding induced pluripotent stem cells as human embryos. In some cases the authors succeed only 
in charting the ambiguities. Neville Cobbe represents this visually in a graph of shades of grey 
framed by Cartesian X- and Y-axes (p. 146), to illustrate the ethical evaluation of interspecies 
research. The subject of interspecies mixtures is explored in more depth in another publication, 
Chimeras Children (Continuum, 2012), which Calum Mackellar, another Barcelona discussant, and I 
recently co-edited.  However, we also have had to acknowledge perplexity in the face of some 
possible creatures. For in some cases the obscurity results not from the limited intellectual capacity 
of the beholder but from the nature of the object itself, as was recognised already by Aristotle,    
“Nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life in such a way that it is impossible to 
determine the exact line of demarcation, nor on which side thereof an intermediate form should 
lie….So, in the sea, there are certain objects concerning which one would be at a loss to determine 
whether they be animal or vegetable” (History of animals 8.1) 
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